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The selection of task-relevant informa-
tion from amongst task-irrelevant or
distracting information is key to suc-
cessful performance, and much debate
has focused on the processing stage(s) at
which this selection takes place. Early-
selection theory claimed that the selec-
tion of task-relevant information occurs
at an early perceptual level of process-
ing, so that only targets are perceptually
encoded (Cherry, 1953; Broadbent, 1958).
In contrast, late-selection theory claimed
that both targets and distractors are per-
ceptually encoded and that target selection
occurs at a late post-perceptual level of
processing (DeutSch and DeutSch, 1963).
Lavie (1995) attempted to reconcile these
theories by suggesting that early and late
selection occur, respectively, when the per-
ceptual load associated with the selection
of the target is high and low.
Thus, according to load theory, when
the perceptual load associated with tar-
get selection is high, perceptual resources
are completely exhausted with perceptual
processing of the target and unavailable
for perceptual processing of distractors;
conversely, when the perceptual load
associated with target selection is low,
perceptual resources are not completely
occupied with perceptual processing of
the target and automatically spill over to
allow perceptual processing of distractors.
In sum, load theory suggests that early
selection is possible only when percep-
tual capacity is exhausted. When capacity
is not exhausted, post-perceptual mecha-
nismsmust be invoked to inhibit irrelevant
information that received perceptual pro-
cessing (Macdonald and Lavie, 2008).
The majority of studies providing evi-
dence in support of load theory have used
the flanker paradigm which presents dis-
tractors and targets at fixed separations
(Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) and have
shown that higher perceptual load gen-
erates lower distractor interference. These
studies interpret lower distractor inter-
ference under high perceptual load as
an expression of spatial attention that
is more narrowly focused on the tar-
get. In order to test this interpretation
directly, we presented distractors at vary-
ing separations from targets in a vari-
ant of the flanker paradigm (Eriksen and
St. James, 1986) and measured distractor
interference as a function of separation
to index the spatial profile of attention.
In addition, and following Lavie (1995),
we manipulated perceptual load using
not just the more standard stimulus-
based manipulations (involving varying
the number of filler items surround-
ing the to-be-identified target item) but
also task-based manipulations (involving
varying the spatial-resolution difficulty of
a secondary perceptual task performed
after target identification). Note that
stimulus-based manipulations are possi-
bly confounded with “dilution” of dis-
tractors (Tsal and Benoni, 2010). For
both types of perceptual load manip-
ulations, however, we showed that the
spatial profile of attention was more
focused when perceptual load was high
and less focused when it was low (Caparos
and Linnell, 2009, 2010; Linnell and
Caparos, 2011), consistent with the cen-
tral tenet of load theory that percep-
tual load affects early perceptual-level
selection.
Critically, however, high perceptual
load only focused spatial attention when
working memory load was low (i.e.,
when one, as opposed to six, digits were
held in memory) and, thus, when cogni-
tive resources were available (Linnell and
Caparos, 2011). This finding is not con-
sistent with the claim of load theory that
high perceptual load focuses spatial atten-
tion automatically (and with the finding
of Lavie et al., 2004, that perceptual and
working memory load exert independent
effects on distractor interference; see dis-
cussion of this finding in Caparos and
Linnell, 2010, and in Linnell and Caparos,
2011). The fact that perceptual load only
focuses spatial attention when cognitive
resources are available raises the possi-
bility that perceptual load is important
in early selection not because it exhausts
perceptual resources but rather because
it engages cognitive resources sufficiently
on the task in hand to focus spatial
attention.
The requirement for cognitive
resources may not be great since even
groups that demonstrate impairments
in cognitive control such as the elderly
and high-trait-anxious can show levels
of selection indistinguishable from their
younger and low-trait-anxious counter-
parts under high perceptual load (Maylor
and Lavie, 1998; Bishop, 2009). We argue
that increasing perceptual load increases
task difficulty in a straightforward fashion
that only impacts perceptual difficulty;
this does not challenge cognitive resources
but simply engages them in the focusing of
spatial attention (see also the suggestion of
Eysenck and Derakshan, 2011, that “when
the task is demanding and there are clear
task goals, high-anxious individuals have a
high level of motivation [andmake] exten-
sive use of attentional control strategies”).
A high-perceptual-load task is according
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to this conception a task that perceptually
draws one in; it encourages the investment
of cognitive resources - that might other-
wise have been spent on mind wandering
or other distractions - on the focusing of
spatial attention. Compatible with this,
perceptual load has been reported to
decrease self-reported mind-wandering
and to improve selection in proportion
to improvements in mind-wandering
(Forster and Lavie, 2009).
In essence, we are arguing that per-
ceptual load—whether it is manipulated
using stimulus or task complexity—is
a perceptual-difficulty manipulation that
motivates cognitive engagement with a
task. This is compatible with the com-
mon finding that perceptual load exerts
considerably larger or more consistent
effects on selection when it is blocked
rather than varied from trial to trial (e.g.,
Theeuwes et al., 2004) but can also explain
the smaller residual effects of load on
a trial-by-trial basis. Although increasing
perceptual load will increase perceptual
difficulty, what is difficult and engaging
to one individual or group of partici-
pants may not be difficult and engaging
to another. Computer gamers and ASD
participants have both been argued to
possess more perceptual resources than
controls and their greater distractibility
at lower perceptual loads (Green and
Bavelier, 2003; Remington et al., 2009)
may be explained by these loads not being
sufficiently perceptually difficult to induce
cognitive engagement. This is a different
account from that offered by load theory
which does not invoke any differences in
cognitive engagement; according to load
theory, the key difference between groups
that differ in their perceptual capacity
is whether or not fixed-capacity percep-
tual resources are exhausted (Maylor and
Lavie, 1998).
As soon as one explains the effect of
perceptual load on early perceptual-level
selection as an effect of attentional engage-
ment one should allow that conditions of
high perceptual load may not be the only
ones supporting early selection; even when
the perceptual difficulty of the task is low,
early selection may be possible and distrac-
tors may not be perceptually processed.
This is exactly what was found in a task
of local selection where we showed that
increasing task interest by increasing social
relevance, without changing perceptual
load, focused spatial attention and thus
improved early perceptual-level selection
(Linnell et al., 2013). In addition, groups
that differ in their emotional responses
and default attentional state also differ in
their propensity for early perceptual-level
selection: in a task of local selection with
no emotional content, high-trait-anxious
participants displayed more focused spa-
tial attention than low-trait-anxious ones
(Caparos and Linnell, 2012). High-trait-
anxious individuals are likely to make
more effort in order to avoid failure at
a task (Staal, 2004; Sarter et al., 2006),
resulting in cognitive resources being more
engaged to focus spatial attention.
Differences in default attentional state
may also underpin the far greater facility
for early selection in remote peoples com-
pared to urbanized peoples. The Himba
are a remote people living in the savan-
nah of northern Namibia; in a range of
tasks of local selection, they consistently
displayed more focused spatial attention
than British participants living in London
and than Himba who had adopted an
urbanized way of life (Linnell et al., 2013).
This was not a result of the Himba having
fewer perceptual resources because they
showed the same sensitivity to increas-
ing perceptual load as British partici-
pants and showed focused spatial attention
even at the lowest perceptual load (De
Fockert et al., 2011). Rather, we argue that
remote peoples have a default attentional
state that favors full cognitive engagement
with the task in hand, whereas urban-
ized peoples—perhaps because they are
more stressed—have a default attentional
state that favors the division of cognitive
resources between monitoring the wider
environment for dangers or opportuni-
ties and performing the task in hand
(Linnell et al., 2013).
Our explanation of these default
differences between urbanized and non-
urbanized groups invokes a variant of
the Yerkes-Dodson law (Yerkes and
Dodson, 1908) that links task perfor-
mance to attentional state by an inverted
U-shaped function. According to this
law, task performance—here attentional
selection—peaks at an intermediate atten-
tional state. This intermediate state may
not be the default attentional state, at
least in the urbanized peoples who have
participated in most studies of attention.
The default attentional state in urban-
ized peoples may favor late over early
selection; processing contextual infor-
mation at least to perceptual levels may
be advisable in complex and dynamic
urban environments—where distractors
can suddenly become targets—and there-
fore worth the cost when distractors have
to be ignored at post-perceptual levels in
the service of task goals. Nevertheless, we
are just starting to understand how alter-
ing the motivational significance of the
task in hand may shift this balance (e.g.,
Padmala and Pessoa, 2011).
In sum, we suggest that altering the
perceptual load associated with target
processing—whether by stimulus-based or
task-based manipulations—is just one of
a number of ways of affecting the engage-
ment of cognitive resources with the task
in hand and that it is increasing engage-
ment with a target stimulus that is key to
achieving its early perceptual-level selec-
tion and not the exhausting of percep-
tual capacity. Attentional engagement and
early perceptual selection (i) may be the
default in remote peoples even when
perceptual load is low and there are no
special motivating factors and (ii) may be
demonstrable in urbanized peoples when
they are confronted not just with high
perceptual load but also with tasks of
social or emotional significance. It is time
not just to bring the study of attention
and motivation together, but to recognize
that motivation is key to a core construct
of attention research, namely perceptual
load.
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